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Case No. 20040955CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count each of 
receiving or transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree 
felony, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
burglary, a second degree felony, and theft, a second degree 
felony (R. 0417-12: 1-2; R. 0417-14: 1-2). This court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3 (2) (e) (West 2004) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Should this court consider defendant's claim that the 
reasonable doubt instruction was incorrect where defense counsel 
affirmatively approved the instruction at trial, thus inviting 
the very error from which he appeals? 
"Whether a jury instruction correctly states the law 
presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness." State v. 
Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, 1 11, 62 P.3d 444. When a party fails 
to make an objection, however, no standard of review applies 
because the matter is generally waived on appeal. 
2. Did defense counsel perform deficiently when, after the 
court denied his motion to dismiss, he failed to move for a 
directed verdict? 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington. 4 66 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
This claim presents a question of law, reviewed on the record of 
the underlying trial. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, M 
16-17, 12 P.3d 92. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules are 
dispositive. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of receiving or 
transferring a stolen vehicle, a second degree felony, and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 0417-
14: 1-2). In another case, arising out of an incident a month 
earlier, he was charged with burglary and theft (R. 0417-12: 1-
-2-
2). The trial court consolidated the two cases for purposes of 
trial (R. 126: 148) -1 When all the evidence was in, defendant 
moved to dismiss, and the trial court denied the motion (R. 126: 
140, 143). The jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 117-18). 
The court sentenced defendant to one-to-fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison on the felony charge and six months in jail on the 
misdemeanor charge, to be served concurrently with the prison 
sentence imposed on the two charges arising from the earlier 
incident and with credit for time served (Id.). Defendant filed 
this timely appeal (R. 124). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The December Burglary and Theft 
In December of 2003, defendant decided to rob the home of 
the father of someone he disliked (R. 126: 110). To that end, he 
and his friend, Christopher Clark, drove defendant's parents' 
yellow Cavalier to LaSal (Id. at 114). There, according to 
Clark's testimony, defendant burglarized the home while Clark 
stayed outside as a lookout (Id. at 109, 112, 114-15). Defendant 
emerged from the home with a CD player and speaker (Id. at 113, 
116-17). In the car on the way back to Salt Lake, defendant 
showed Clark a handgun he had also stolen from the home, 
distinctive because of its painted handle (Id. at 117). 
1
 Hereafter, to avoid unnecessary repetition, all cites in 
the State's brief to the red record volumes will be referenced to 
case 0412-14. 
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The officer who investigated the burglary and theft 
testified that the home had been forcibly entered, probably with 
an ice ax with wood chips stuck to its tip, found inside the home 
(Id. at 54-56, 62). The door frame had been split, and "it 
looked like the house had been ransacked" (Id. at 50). The 
officer also testified that tire prints he later took from the 
Cavalier resembled the only set of tire tracks he saw at the 
LaSal home (Id. at 79). In addition to a missing entertainment 
center, the homeowner listed as stolen two shotguns, 2 rifles, 
and a Walther PPK handgun (Id. at 60). 
The January Car Incident 
In early January of 2004, defendant's mother contacted the 
San Juan County Sheriff's Office, stating that her son was at a 
home in LaSal with her car, the yellow Cavalier, and that she 
wanted help in getting it back (Id. at 64). Deputy Michael 
Harris responded to the home. Rather than the expected Cavalier, 
however, he found a Jeep parked at the residence (Id. at 65) . 
Deputy Harris ran the license number and discovered the vehicle 
had been stolen from Salt Lake (Id. at 65). 
Deputy Harris entered the home and was directed by its 
occupants to a back bedroom. The deputy knocked and awakened 
Christopher Clark (Id. at 65-66). When the deputy questioned 
Clark about the Jeep, Clark told him it belonged to his mother. 
Because Deputy Harris knew the Jeep had been stolen, however, he 
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arrested Clark and took him outside to his police car (Id. at 
66) . 
Before the officer could re-enter, the homeowner came 
"walking out carrying this pistol hooked on her finger. She said 
it was in the - in the mattress of the bed that Christopher Clark 
was sleeping in" (Id. at 66). The deputy then found Clark's 
wallet and some papers on the night stand adjacent to the bed and 
the key to the Jeep on the floor between the night stand and the 
bed (Id^ at 67, 86-87). 
Deputy Harris questioned Clark again. This time, Clark told 
him the Jeep belonged to the mother of a friend and that he and 
defendant had borrowed it in order to drive from Salt Lake to 
LaSal to visit defendant's mother (Id.). Clark also told Deputy 
Harris that defendant's mother's Cavalier had broken down in Salt 
Lake. When the deputy asked Clark if there was anything in the 
Cavalier he should know about, Clark admitted to ownership of 
marijuana in a black case in the center console (Id. at 68-69; 
125). He specifically declined ownership, however, of other 
items of paraphernalia in the bag, which he said belonged to 
defendant (Id^ at 70-71).2 
2
 Items of paraphernalia found in the black bag pursuant to 
an inventory search included scales, a mirror, a syringe, 
baggies, a spoon handle, and a coin (R. 126: 71). Also found in 
the Cavalier was a bullet of the same caliber as the handgun 
stolen from the LaSal home and shotgun shells that fit the stolen 
shotgun. Additional bullets and shells of the same size were 
found in the burglarized home. (Id. at 101). 
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Just before trial, Deputy Harris asked Clark one final time 
about the ownership of the Jeep (Id. at 75). Clark reiterated 
that the Cavalier belonging to defendant's mother had broken down 
in Salt Lake (Id. at 76). Then, for the first time, he stated 
that he and defendant looked for another car in Salt Lake, found 
a Jeep parked in a driveway with its engine running, jumped in, 
and took off for Monticello (Id. at 76, 126). Clark also changed 
his story about the ownership of the handgun. At first, he had 
told Deputy Harris that it belonged to the woman at whose home he 
was living (Id. at 76, 91). Eventually, however, Clark said that 
defendant had told him the handgun came from a burglary in LaSal 
and that defendant had asked Clark to hold it for him (Id. at 76-
77, 83). 
Christopher Clark's trial testimony was consistent with the 
last story he told Deputy Harris. In addition, he testified that 
after he and defendant drove the stolen Jeep to Monticello, he 
went to sleep in the back bedroom and defendant went to see his 
mother (Id. at 122). He thought defendant had the handgun and 
only learned otherwise after the officer awoke him (Id. at 123, 
133). He reiterated that both he and defendant had burglarized 
the home in LaSal and that they both had stolen the Jeep in Salt 
Lake (Id^ at 126). 
Christopher Clark further testified that he had lied in 
earlier statements to the police in order to protect defendant 
and lessen his own criminal culpability (Id. at 108-09, 128) . He 
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conceded that he would be sentenced for his part in the crimes 
after his trial testimony against defendant (Id. at 130). 
The LaSal homeowner whose house had been burglarized 
identified the handgun found on the bed where Clark was sleeping 
by a distinctive chip on the clip, as well as by its black 
handle, which had been painted over (Id. at 98). In addition, 
the serial number on the handgun matched documentation 
of ownership that the homeowner provided (Id. at 97).3 
Based on this evidence, the jury convicted defendant, as 
charged, of burglary, theft, receiving or transferring a stolen 
motor vehicle, and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 94). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the jury instruction defining 
reasonable doubt was incorrect and that, despite defendant's 
failure to object, exceptional circumstances call for appellate 
review. This argument fails at the outset because defendant 
affirmatively approved the jury instructions, thus inviting the 
alleged error of which he now complains. Moreover, he fails to 
demonstrate any exceptional circumstances. The jury instruction 
was correct at the time of trial. The fact that the law changed 
There was some initial confusion on this point because 
the handgun serial number provided by the homeowner appeared to 
be different by one digit from the number that appeared on the 
handgun. After rechecking the documentation, however, the 
homeowner realized he had made a mistake as to that digit. In 
fact, the serial numbers matched. See R. 126: 97. 
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nine months after his conviction does nothing to undermine the 
correctness of the instruction at the time it was given. 
Defendant also argues that his counsel performed 
ineffectively by failing to file a motion for directed verdict. 
Where a motion for directed verdict and a motion to dismiss are 
judged by the same legal standard, and where the court denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court would also necessarily 
have denied a motion for directed verdict. Because failure to 
make a futile motion cannot constitute deficient performance, 




THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE 
REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION WAS 
INCORRECT BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL 
AFFIRMATIVELY APPROVED THE 
INSTRUCTION AT TRIAL, THUS INVITING 
THE VERY ERROR OF WHICH HE NOW 
COMPLAINS; EVEN ON THE MERITS HIS 
CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THE INSTRUCTION 
WAS CORRECT AT THE TIME OF TRIAL 
Defendant claims that the reasonable doubt instruction given 
at his trial violated the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-8. That reasonable doubt 
instruction, in compliance with State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 
(Utah 1997), overruled in relevant part by State v. Reyes, 2005 
UT 33, 116 P.3d 305, informed the jury that "[t]he state must 
eliminate all reasonable doubt" (R. 104). After defendant's 
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conviction was final, the Utah Supreme Court "expressly 
abandon[ed]" the "^obviate all reasonable doubt' element of the 
Robertson test." State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 1 30. Relying on 
Reyes, defendant argues that the reasonable doubt instruction 
here created the possibility that the jury found him guilty based 
on a degree of proof lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 7. Because he did not raise this issue at trial, 
he seeks review under the rubric of exceptional circumstances. 
Id. at 11-12. 
At the outset, defendant's claim fails because defense 
counsel at trial affirmatively approved of the instruction to 
which he now objects, thus inviting the alleged error on appeal. 
When asked if she had any exceptions to the jury instructions, 
defense counsel responded, "I accept everything. That's fine. 
They're all okay" (R. 126: 148). 
Under these factual circumstances, defendant's claim should 
not be considered. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, If 52-55, 
70 P.3d 111 (refusing to find error where defendant approved the 
instruction before it was given to the jury). Rule 19(e), Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides in part: "Unless a party 
objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, 
the instruction may not be assigned as error except to avoid a 
manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (e)(West 2004). Thus, 
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manifest injustice, not exceptional circumstances, is the sole 
route around the preservation rule.4 
Taking its guidance from rule 19(e), Utah's appellate courts 
"have been very reluctant to review jury instructions and other 
matters not preserved for appeal by means of an objection at 
trial." State v. Anderson, 927 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1996); 
accord State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987); State v, John, 
770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989). Most pertinent to this case, "the 
manifest injustice exception has no application in cases in which 
the defendant invited the very error complained of on appeal." 
State v. Kiriluk, 1999 UT App 30, 1 22, 975 P.2d 469 (quotations 
and citation omitted); accord State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 5 
54. Here, where defense counsel specifically approved the jury 
instructions on the record, any claimed error on appeal was 
plainly invited. For this reason, his claim cannot give rise to 
a manifest injustice and should not be considered. 
Moreover, even on the merits, defendant cannot prevail. He 
argues that his failure to object to the jury instruction at 
trial should be excused by exceptional circumstances because "ya 
change in law or the settled interpretation of law color[ed 
defense counsel's] failure to have raised [the] issue at trial.'" 
4
 The exceptional circumstances exception is "ill-defined 
and applies primarily to rare procedural anomalies." State v. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1209 n.3 (Utah 1993). Defendant has cited 
no authority for the far-reaching proposition that any case 
accepted for certiorari review creates an exceptional 
circumstance for purposes of circumventing the preservation rule. 
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Br. of Aplt. at 11 (quoting State ex. rel. T.M., 2003 UT App 191, 
1 16, 73 P.3d 959). Specifically, defendant points to the 
following chronology: 
January 2004 Court of Appeals issues State 
v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 84 
P.3d 841, upholding the 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" 
jury instruction, similar to 
instruction given in this case 
May 2004 Utah Supreme Court grants 
certiorari review in Reyes. 
September 2004 Trial and conviction in this 
case. 
June 2005 Supreme Court abandons 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" 
instruction. State v. Reyes, 
2005 UT 33, I 30, 116 P.3d 
305. 
In essence, defendant argues that because Reyes was accepted for 
certiorari review prior to his trial, the law was necessarily 
"unsettled" and should excuse his failure to object to the jury 
instruction. 
First, from a policy perspective, defendant's argument would 
give rise to a wholly untenable rule. Whenever the Utah Supreme 
Court granted certiorari review, it would necessarily create an 
"unsettled" area of law subject to automatic consideration on 
appeal as an exceptional circumstance. Such a rule would 
undermine the invited error doctrine without any countervailing 
advancement to the administration of justice. 
Second, the law was not unsettled in September of 2004 when 
defendant was tried and convicted. The law governing the 
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"obviate all reasonable doubt'' language in the reasonable doubt 
jury instruction had been clear and consistent since 1989, when 
the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-
49 (Utah 1989), adopted an analysis requiring a reasonable doubt 
instruction that "*should specifically state that the State's 
proof must obviate all reasonable doubt.'" State v. Robertson, 
932 P.2d 1219, 1232 (Utah 1997)(quoting State v. Ireland, 773 
P.2d 1375, 1381 (Utah 1989)(Stewart, J., dissenting)). 
The law, then, was clear at the time defendant was tried. 
It simply changed nine months after his conviction was final. 
See State v. Reyes, 2005 UT 33 at 5 30 (abandoning requirement of 
"obviate all reasonable doubt" language); accord State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, 1 21. The later change did nothing to undermine the 
correctness of the instruction at defendant's trial.5 For this 
reason, even on the merits, defendant's argument fails. 
5
 Moreover, nothing prevented defendant at trial from 
challenging the reasonable doubt instruction if he thought it was 
constitutionally infirm. Indeed, the court of appeals in Reyes 
had described the Robertson three-part reasonable doubt test as 
"constitutionally flawed." State v. Reyes, 2004 UT App 8, 5 22, 
30, 84 P.3d 841. Nothing prevented defendant from preserving his 
issue by making this argument at trial. See State v. Lopez, 886 
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1994) (holding that defendant could not raise due 
process for first time on appeal in absence of establishing 
either plain error or exceptional circumstances). 
-12-
POINT TWO 
AFTER THE TRIAL COURT DENIED HIS 
MOTION TO DISMISS, DEFENDANT WAS 
NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOVE 
FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT, WHERE THAT 
MOTION PLAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN 
FUTILE 
Defendant also argues that his counsel rendered ineffective 
assistance by not moving for a directed verdict at the close of 
the State's evidence (Br. of Aplt. at 12). Defendant contends 
that although his counsel moved to dismiss at that juncture, he 
also should also have moved for a directed verdict because "Utah 
appellate courts have imposed separate standards for granting 
motions for directed verdicts than for [sic] motions to dismiss" 
(Id. at 13). These "separate standards," he argues, mean that 
NN[t]he two motions cannot be substituted for one another" (Id. at 
14) . 
Defendant's argument fails as a matter of law because the 
standards for a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed 
verdict are, for all practical purposes, identical. 
When a defendant files a motion to dismiss at the end of the 
State's case-in-chief, the trial court must grant the motion 
"[i]f the State fails to produce ^believable evidence of all the 
elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, 
f 40, 70 P.3d 111 (quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 13, 20 
P.3d 300 (citations and quotations omitted)). "Believable 
evidence," in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the 
evidence must be "capable of supporting a finding of guilt beyond 
-13-
a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22 at 1 41 
(quoting State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at f 15). 
Similarly, when a defendant files a motion for directed 
verdict at the end of the State's case, the trial court has to 
determine whether "the State . . . establish[ed] a prima facie 
case against the defendant by producing 'believable evidence of 
all the elements of the crime charged.'" State v. Clark, 2001 UT 
9 at 1 13 (quoting State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 
1992)(citations omitted)). If the jury can find defendant guilty 
beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court must submit the case 
for its consideration. Ld. (citing State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994)); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-3; 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17 (p) . 
At the end of the State's case, defendant moved to dismiss 
for insufficient evidence, and the trial court denied the motion 
(R. 126: 140, 143-44).6 Denial of the motion told defendant that 
the State had adduced sufficient evidence for a jury to fairly 
conclude that all elements of the crime had been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Consequently, had defendant moved for a 
directed verdict, which he would have done at precisely the same 
time, he would have received precisely the same ruling. That is, 
where the evidence was sufficient to support all elements of the 
crime charged, it was also necessarily sufficient to establish a 
6
 Defendant nowhere challenges the correctness of the trial 
court's denial of his motion to dismiss. 
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prima facie case. The distinction defendant seeks to make 
between a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed verdict is 
nothing more than an exercise in semantics. See, e.g., State v. 
Robertson, 2005 UT App 419, 1 14 (employing identical analysis 
for a motion to dismiss and a motion for directed verdict). 
Where a motion for a directed verdict would have been judged 
by the same standard as the motion to dismiss that counsel made 
and the court denied, there is no possibility that such a motion 
would have resulted in anything but another denial. Defendant 
cannot prevail on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
because the failure to raise a futile objection can never be an 
adequate ground for objectively deficient performance. See, 
e.g., State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, 5 27, 55 P.3d 1147. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions of one count each of receiving or transferring a 
stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, and possession of 
drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. 
7\A^ " 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this J]_ day of October, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
-15-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing brief of appellee were mailed first-class, postage 
prepaid, to K. Andrew Fitzgerald, attorney for appellant, Office 
of the Public Defender, 55 East 100 South, Moab, Utah 84532, this 
I/' day of October, 2005. 
-16-
